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I. INTRODUCTION
The "trial penalty" is a concept widely accepted by all the major
actors in the criminal justice system: defendants, prosecutors, de-
fense attorneys, court employees, and judges. The notion is that
defendants receive longer sentences at trial than they would have
through plea bargain, often substantially longer. The concept is
intuitive: longer sentences are necessary in order to induce set-
tlements and without a high settlement rate it would be impossi-
ble for courts as currently structured to sustain their immense
caseload.
While intuitively appealing, this view of the trial penalty is
completely at odds with economic prediction. Since both prosecu-
tors and defendants have the ability to reject unappealing settle-
ments, sentences at trial should be nearly the same as those ar-
rived at through pleas. This is a straightforward application of
the "shadow of the law" concept articulated by Mnookin and
Kornhauser, as well as others.'
This article attempts to answer two questions relating to the
trial penalty. Why is belief in its existence so widespread, given
* Assistant Professor of Law, Business Economics, and Public Policy at University of
Pennsylvania Law School. Professor Abrams thanks Professor Wesley Oliver and the Du-
quesne University School of Law for hosting an outstanding conference that led to this
piece. I am also grateful to participants at the conference whose questions and comments
improve this article. Pearl Li provided excellent research assistance.
1. William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971);
Robert N. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce. 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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that it is at odds with basic economic theory? Which theory does
empirical analysis of actual sentencing data support?
I argue that there is a fundamental misunderstanding that is
largely responsible for the belief in the trial penalty: the failure to
distinguish between conditional and unconditional expected val-
ues. I also provide a brief overview of an empirical study that at-
tempts to distinguish between the two theories.2 The results of
that study are surprising and support neither theory-not only is
there no evidence for a trial penalty, there appears to be a trial
discount!
II. THE SOURCE OF THE CONFUSION: CONDITIONAL VERSUS
UNCONDITIONAL EXPECTATIONS
In order to clarify the confusion about the trial penalty, it is first
necessary to discuss the mathematical concept of expected value.
An expected value is the value of an outcome weighted by its
probability. For example, the expected value of a 50-50 coin flip
where a head nets the recipient $4 and tails yields $2 will be EV =
(0.5)($4) + (0.5)($2) = $3. This is the unconditional expected value.
What does it mean to say that the expected value of this coin
flip is $3? Clearly no individual flip will pay off $3; the payment
will be either $4 for heads or $2 for tails. The expected value is
the amount that will be received on average over a large number
of trials. The more flips, the closer the average will come to the
expected value.3 For example, 10 flips might yield 6 heads and 4
tails, for an average payoff of $3.20. 100 flips might yield 48
heads and 52 tails, for an average payoff of $2.96. The average
approaches the expected value as the number of flips increases.
Of course, sometimes more information can be acquired about
events with some randomness in them. For example, consider a
game played by choosing a card at random from a deck, where the
player is paid according to the suit of the card as follows: club =
$1, spade = $2, diamond = $3 and heart = $4. Since the probabil-
ity of drawing each suit is equally likely at 25%, the expected val-
ue of the draw is EV = (0.25)($1) + (0.25)($2) + (0.25)($3) +
(0.25)($4) = $2.50. Now consider how this changes with a bit of
additional information-in this case, the knowledge that the card
drawn is red. There are now only two possible suits that were
2. This paper outlines my findings published in David S. Abrams, Is Pleading Really a
Bargain?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 200 (Dec. 2011).
3. The theorem that states this is called the Law of Large Numbers.
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drawn, diamonds and hearts, each with a 50% probability. Thus
the conditional expected value may be calculated as EV = (0.5)($3)
+ (0.5)($4) = $3.50. The knowledge that the card drawn is red in-
creased the expected value of the draw substantially.
While the courts are a long way from the card table, they retain
a crucial similarity-an element of randomness. No one can tell
for certain in advance what a randomly selected jury or a judge
will decide for a particular case. Thus, economists treat the ques-
tion of likely sentencing outcomes in a mathematically identical
way to the card draw-as a random variable. This means that we
cannot predict the outcome with certainty, but we can say some-
thing about average outcomes after a large number of events.
Thus for a defendant charged with a crime, we can predict the un-
conditional expected sentence just as we can calculate the uncondi-
tional expected value of a card draw. This expected sentence will
include a substantial likelihood that there is no prison sentence-
due to being found not guilty, dropped prosecution, or other rea-
sons.
Now we may also calculate the conditional expected sentence,
conditioning on a finding of guilt at trial. This means that the
case has proceeded to the guilt/innocence phase and that the de-
fendant has in fact been found guilty. It will not include the large
number of cases where this is not the outcome. The conditional
expected sentence will necessarily be substantially higher than
the unconditional expected sentence because it will exclude many
cases that result in zero sentence. Thus, it is crucial to be clear
about which type of expected sentence one is concerned with, and
this depends on the question at issue.
A defendant who has been found guilty and wishes to have the
best guess of the likely sentence he will receive will be interested
in the conditional expected sentence. But the defendant who has
been offered a plea deal, but has not yet been found guilty should
be interested in the unconditional expected sentence when trying
to determine whether or not to accept the sentence proffered by
the prosecutor. If the defendant is risk-neutral,4 then he should
accept the plea deal if the sentence is lower than the unconditional
expected sentence; otherwise he should insist upon a trial, because
on average he will receive a shorter sentence by making that
choice. Thus the difference between the trial penalty perspective
4. A risk-neutral individual is one for whom the value of a risky event is equal to the
expected value. That is, someone who neither likes nor dislikes gambles.
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and the shadow of the law perspective comes down to a compari-
son between the conditional and unconditional expected sentence.
The mistake that is frequently made is considering the conditional
expected sentence in the context of a defendant with a plea offer, a
setting where the unconditional expected sentence is the appro-
priate one.
The "shadow of the law" concept simply applies the use of ex-
pected values to negotiation decisions. 5 Originally applied to di-
vorce settlements, it has become a widely-known theory in the law
and economics literature. The essence of the idea is that in a ne-
gotiation, both attorneys may use the threat of going to trial if
they believe the current bargain is unfair. In the setting of plea
bargaining, we assume that the defense attorney is trying to min-
imize the sentence, the prosecutor is trying to maximize it, and
administrative costs for both pleas and trials are small. In this
setting, the defense attorney would reject any plea deal with a
sentence longer than the expected sentence. Similarly, the prose-
cutor would reject a deal where the sentence is shorter than the
expected sentence. The only solution to these two conditions is
that the sentence arrived at via plea is the same as the expected
sentence from trial. The name of the theory is due to the fact that
while many sentences are achieved through bargaining rather
than through direct application of the law, the law still casts a
shadow over the negotiation proceedings. I now describe the first
empirical test of this theory in the criminal justice setting.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
To test the shadow of the law and trial penalty theories, it is
necessary to evaluate how sentences handed down at trial com-
pare to those arrived at through plea bargain.' I obtained data on
cases from the early 2000s from Cook County, Illinois, the largest
unified criminal court in the United States, which receives the
bulk of its cases from the City of Chicago. A simple comparison
shows that the average sentence resulting from a plea is 2.4 years,
which is 1.1 years longer than that from trial (see Table 1 below).
5. See supra note 1.
6. These results were first described in Abrams, supra note 2.
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Summary Statistics
Variable Trial Plea Difference i t-stat
Case & Offender Characteristics
Number of charges 2.34 2.11 -0.23 -4.97
Defendant Race (Black = 1) 0.89 0.89 0.001 -0.51
Defendant Sex (Female= 1) 0.14 0.19 0.051 8.96
Defendant Age 29.62 28.91 -0.711 -4.47,
Incarceration 0.26 0.59 0.331 45.16
Sentence 1.25 2.36 1.121 32.37
Sentence (non-zero) 2.91. 2.44 -0.471 -9.20
Finding of Guilt 0.46 1.001 0.531 196.47
Offense Type
Drug Possession 0.39 0.461 0.071 8.79
Drug Distribution. 0.22! 0.151 -0.071 -11.98
Weapons 0.10' 0.06! -0.031 -9.22
Theft 0.021 0.07_ 0.051 12.55
Burglary 0.061 0.061 0.001 0.47
Robbery 0.041 0.04 0.001 1.04
Car Theft 0.03 0.04 0.011 3.48:
Assault and Battery 0.051 0.03 -0.021 -7.52
Summary Statistics for 42,552 case-level observations obtained from the
Cook County Clerk's Office for cases initiated between 1997 - 2001 and
resolved by 2004. Offense characteristics reported for first offense. Data
includes 28 judges, each with a minimum of 100 cases. Homicides are
excluded due to potential non-random assignment. Additional case
selection details are available in Abrams, Bertrand, Mullainathan (2012).
Decomposing the data by type of offense still shows that pleas re-
sult in substantially longer sentences on average.
This may seem surprising-that sentence lengths are shorter on
average when they result from pleas rather than trials. But it is
important to remember that those sentences that do not result in
a sentence of incarceration count as zero. If one only compares
sentences of incarceration, the average is longer for those from
trial. This is exactly the source of the trial penalty confusion. The
unconditional expected sentence is longer for plea bargains, but
the expected sentence, conditional on having some prison sen-
tence, is longer at trial.
This straightforward comparison, however, does not take into
account the self-selection of defendants and prosecutors into plea
bargains or trials. Perhaps cases involving less serious crimes are
more likely to choose to go to trial, resulting in a low average sen-
tence length that has little to do with the choice of plea versus tri-
781
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al. An ideal study would examine a large sample of otherwise
identical cases where defendants are randomly assigned to either
take a plea or go to trial. Such a field experiment would not only
be impractical, but certainly unethical.
One approach to the challenge of self-selection is a regression
analysis that attempts to control for the variables that influence a
person's likelihood of pleading versus trial. These may include
demographic characteristics of the individuals, the type and sever-
ity of the alleged crime, personal characteristics of the attorneys,
and others. While preferable to a simple comparison of averages
(as above) the method of using control variables is incomplete be-
cause one will never have access to all control variables that may
influence the decision to plea. The second method attempts to ap-
proximate the ideal random assignment and is called the instru-
mental variables approach. This is a relatively new technique
that has become extremely popular among economists since the
1990s. In this method, random assignment to plea or trial is sim-
ulated using a proxy, the instrumental variable, with the goal of
reducing self-selection bias. Below, I report results from both of
these methods. They do not change the central conclusion that
there is no evidence for a trial penalty.
Summary statistics of case outcomes separated by case charac-
teristics (Table 1) showed significant differences in outcomes that
support the need for controls in the regression. For example, cas-
es that went to trial tended to have 10% more total charges, indi-
cating that these were likely more serious crimes. Cases involving
female and younger defendants were more likely to be resolved via
plea bargain, as were theft and drug possession cases. Ultimately,
the compositions of the cases that went to trial varied substantial-
ly from those that were resolved in pleas.
Eight regression analyses were performed, with each controlling
for a different combination of variables that could potentially in-
fluence plea bargain self-selection. These include the case type,
the number of charges, and the year, as well as defendant race,
sex, and age. The differences in sentencing length were consistent
across the eight regressions, with a standard error of about 0.09
years. The mean difference was 1.15 years, consistent with the
finding of 1.12 years in the model without controls. This suggests
that even after controlling for self-selection, defendants who enter
into plea bargains receive sentences that are on average 14
months longer. Using the same combinations of controls, I also
782 Vol. 51
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found that defendants who plead guilty are about twice as likely to
be incarcerated as those whose cases went to trial.
I chose judge tenure as the instrument, which should predict
likelihood to plea, but in a way not susceptible to selection. Since
more experienced judges have a longer history of case adjudica-
tions, both attorneys will have a better idea of likely outcome of
the case and are thus more likely to agree. This will lead to a
greater rate of plea bargains for cases that are assigned to judges
with longer tenure. Since cases are randomly assigned to judges
this is effectively a randomly determined variable that predicts
the likelihood of pleading. Even though the effect may be small,
using an instrumental variables regression, one may determine
the impact of plea bargaining on sentence length.
To validate the instrument, I analyzed the relationship between
the rate of plea bargains and judicial tenure. I found a statistical-
ly significant positive correlation between plea rate and judicial
tenure. Each additional year on the bench corresponds to a plea
rate increase of 4.7 percentage points. The second step was to
compare sentence length and judicial tenure. I found a similar
positive correlation, but the relatively high standard error indi-
cates that the instrument is relatively weak. Ultimately, the in-
strumental variables approach yielded a similar conclusion to the
ordinary regression: plea bargains result in higher expected sen-
tences than trials.
IV. DISCUSSION
The results from both the regression analysis and the instru-
mental variables analysis indicate that plea bargains actually re-
sult in longer sentences than trials. This conclusion is at odds
with the trial penalty concept, which posits that trials generally
result in longer sentences. But it is also at odds with the shadow
of the law theory, which predicts very similar sentences from trial
and plea bargain. This begs the following questions: Why does
the shadow of the law prediction appear to be incorrect? And why
has the trial penalty theory persisted for so long? I suggest two
answers to each of these questions, beginning with the shadow of
the law.
First, it is possible that defendants are quite risk-averse and
that they prefer a known sentence that is substantially longer
than the expected sentence they would receive at trial. This is at
odds with most work in the area, which finds that not only are
defendants not risk averse, but they may in fact be risk-seeking
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(which may help explain why they are in court in the first place).
A second potential explanation is that rather than counting fines
and sentences of probation as a zero sentence length, they are ac-
tually equivalent to non-zero prison sentences. While almost cer-
tainly true, this is unlikely to explain much of the large disparity
between plea and trial sentences found in this study. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that prison sentence is by far the most im-
portant driver of defendant decision making.
For the failure of the trial penalty prediction, one explanation
may be the availability heuristic, a behavioral phenomenon first
studied by Tversky and Kahneman (1973). This phenomenon is
essentially the notion that people tend to focus on notable events
and ignore more run-of-the-mill ones. While the judges and attor-
neys who champion the trial penalty have the advantage of per-
sonal experience with the incentives of deciding to go trial that
academics are further removed from, their memories are also im-
perfect. The availability heuristic asserts that people are more
likely to remember more exceptional events, and are thus apt to
overweigh the probability of their occurring again. In our context,
law practitioners may deal with dozens of trials that end in short
sentences or that ultimately result in no conviction at all, but the-
se more mundane occurrences may take a backseat to memories of
especially spectacular trials that resulted in very long sentences.
Trials are also more memorable than plea bargains, which are
comparatively short and almost never make the news. Laypeople
(most importantly, defendants) often never hear about the plea
bargains or ordinary trials altogether, so their expectations of go-
ing to trial may be even more skewed.
Another explanation for why the trial penalty does not hold is
the principal-agent problem inherent whenever a defendant hires
(or is assigned) an attorney to represent himself. The incentives of
the defendant and the attorney are never perfectly aligned. De-
fendants want to minimize their sentence length or avoid convic-
tion altogether. Defense attorneys want these things too, of
course, but they often have little personal contact with their de-
fendants, which may lead to other incentives coming to the fore-
front. Their peers are not the defendants, but the prosecutors and
judges, with whom they often maintain long-term relationships-
providing a potential incentive to avoid creating animosity by go-
ing to trial. This distance from their clients is especially im-
portant for public defenders, who are involved in a significant por-
784 Vol. 51
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tion of the data set. Overworked and underpaid defense attorneys
may prefer the brevity of plea bargains to the odyssey of trial.
V. CONCLUSION
The empirical evidence shows little support for the trial penalty,
and in fact there appears to be a plea penalty. Expected sentences
are at least one year longer in plea bargains than in trials, and
incarceration is also about twice as likely to result. These findings
remain unchanged after both controlling for observable case char-
acteristics and using judge tenure as an instrumental variable.
One practical implication of this work is that defense attorneys
should be very aware of the potential divergence of their incen-
tives from their clients. There are certainly cases in which it is in
the defendant's best interest to take a plea deal, but on the aver-
age, going to trial should be considered more heavily by both at-
torneys and defendants. Defense attorneys may wish to consider
presenting clients with statistics on the relative outcomes of
pleading and going to trial, in order to allow them to make more
informed decisions. Greater rotation of court staff may also miti-
gate the natural desire of attorneys to maintain good collegial re-
lations. By increasing awareness that the trial penalty is a myth,
defense attorneys will be able to better inform and serve their cli-
ents.
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